Modeling and experiments to better understand rural livelihoods decision-making
GooseBump
In a space where farmers can choose non-lethal control (pushing animals onto their neighbors), lethal control, or the coordinated set aside of some land as habitat, how do different groups choose (and can lethal control be discouraged)?

This is a symmetric coordination game with much of the same applicability as NonCropShare. In particular, the options available to players ask something like, should I fix the problem (in a possibly socially non-accepted way), should I make it my neighbors’ problem, or should we share the solution to the problem?
Publications
Rakotonarivo, O. S., Jones, I. L., Bell, A., Duthie, A. B., Cusack, J., Minderman, J., Hogan, J., Hodgson, I., & Bunnefeld, N. (2020). Experimental evidence for conservation conflict interventions: The importance of financial payments, community trust and equity attitudes. People and Nature, August, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10155
Sargent, R., Rakotonarivo, O. S., Rushton, S. P., Cascio, B. J., Grau, A., Bell, A. R., Bunnefeld, N., Dickman, A., & Pfeifer, M. (2022). An experimental game to examine pastoralists’ preferences for human–lion coexistence strategies. People and Nature, June, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10393
Bell, A. R., Rakotonarivo, O. S., Bhargava, A., Duthie, A. B., Zhang, W., Sargent, R., Lewis, A. R., & Kipchumba, A. (2023). Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior. Communications Earth and Environment, 4(2023), 27. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-00689-6
Code Base
This game derived from the original NonCropShare code, with some minor clean-up