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GooseBump

In a space where farmers can choose non-lethal control (pushing animals onto their neighbors), lethal control, or the coordinated set aside of some land as habitat, how do different groups choose (and can lethal control be discouraged)?

This is a symmetric coordination game with much of the same applicability as NonCropShare. In particular, the options available to players ask something like, should I fix the problem (in a possibly socially non-accepted way), should I make it my neighbors’ problem, or should we share the solution to the problem?

Publications

Rakotonarivo, O. S., Jones, I. L., Bell, A., Duthie, A. B., Cusack, J., Minderman, J., Hogan, J., Hodgson, I., & Bunnefeld, N. (2020). Experimental evidence for conservation conflict interventions: The importance of financial payments, community trust and equity attitudes. People and Nature, August, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10155


Sargent, R., Rakotonarivo, O. S., Rushton, S. P., Cascio, B. J., Grau, A., Bell, A. R., Bunnefeld, N., Dickman, A., & Pfeifer, M. (2022). An experimental game to examine pastoralists’ preferences for human–lion coexistence strategies. People and Nature, June, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10393


Bell, A. R., Rakotonarivo, O. S., Bhargava, A., Duthie, A. B., Zhang, W., Sargent, R., Lewis, A. R., & Kipchumba, A. (2023). Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior. Communications Earth and Environment, 4(2023), 27. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-00689-6

Code Base

This game derived from the original NonCropShare code, with some minor clean-up

Repository

Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY, 14850

andrew.bell (at) cornell.edu

© 2025 by Andrew Bell. Powered and secured by Wix

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