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NonCropShare

In a world where farmers could do just as well by coordinating around natural enemy services as by spraying, what kind of encouragements are necessary for them to actually try?

This is a symmetric coordination dilemma for four players, with spatial spillovers that make coordination with side vs. corner neighbors into different problems. We’ve applied this structure here (in an insect-based ecosystem service, pesticide drift context) and in GooseBump (a pest animal, human-wildlife conflict context). This structure is plausibly helpful in many other problems where what I do on my property has impacts on my neighbors, and vice versa.

Publications

Bell, A., & Zhang, W. (2016). Payments discourage coordination in ecosystem services provision: evidence from behavioral experiments in Southeast Asia. Environmental Research Letters, 11, 114024. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/11/114024

Bell, A. R., Rakotonarivo, O. S., Bhargava, A., Duthie, A. B., Zhang, W., Sargent, R., Lewis, A. R., & Kipchumba, A. (2023). Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior. Communications Earth and Environment, 4(2023), 27. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-00689-6

Code Base

This was the first NetLogo game we built – the code reads like someone learning as they go

Repository

https://github.com/earth-andrew/noncropshare