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SharedSpace

How does the role of incentives in encouraging fallowing and ecosystem service provision differ as land tenure shifts from private to shared?

This game gives a simple set of options to players (plant crops, or let fallow) in a landscape where access to land varies – some is held privately by one player, some is shared by some or all players. This basic setup may apply to a range of public good or commons problems where land tenure and access is believed to shape willingness to invest, abstain, or share in resources and development.

Publications

Rakotonarivo, O. S., Bell, A., Dillon, B., Duthie, A. B., Kipchumba, A., Rasolofoson, R. A., Razafimanahaka, J., & Bunnefeld, N. (2021). Experimental Evidence on the Impact of Payments and Property Rights on Forest User Decisions. Frontiers in Conservation Science, 2(July), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcosc.2021.661987


Bell, A. R., Rakotonarivo, O. S., Bhargava, A., Duthie, A. B., Zhang, W., Sargent, R., Lewis, A. R., & Kipchumba, A. (2023). Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior. Communications Earth and Environment, 4(2023), 27. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-00689-6

Code Base

This game derived from the original NonCropShare code, setting up variable and mixed public/private land use

Repository

Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY, 14850

andrew.bell (at) cornell.edu

© 2025 by Andrew Bell. Powered and secured by Wix

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